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PREVIEW; Maryland Casualty Company v. The Asbestos
Claims Court, and the Honorable Amy Eddy, Asbestos Claims
Court Judge: What Duty does a Workers’ Compensation
Insurer Owe the Employees of its Insured?
Hannah Higgins*
The Montana Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in this
matter Wednesday, August 14, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. in the Courtroom
of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice Building,
Helena, MT. Kennedy C. Ramos and Daniel W. Hileman will likely
appear on behalf of Petitioner. Alan M. McGarvey will likely appear
on behalf of Respondent.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This case presents two significant issues. The overarching issue
is whether a Writ of Supervisory Control will be granted to resolve
the underlying issue: what duty, if any, a workers’ compensation
insurer owes the employees of its insured. The resolution of the
underlying issue will be an important one, both within the multitude
of pending asbestos claims in Montana and beyond. The Petitioner,
Maryland Casualty Company, claims the Asbestos Claims Court
used an improper standard in determining that Maryland Casualty
Company owed a duty of care to the employees of its insured, W.R.
Grace & Company.1
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Asbestos Claims Court (“ACC”) was established in
November 2017 to streamline asbestos-related cases in Montana.2
Maryland Casualty Company (“MCC”) provided workers’
compensation insurance to W.R. Grace & Company (“Grace”) from
*

Hannah Higgins, Candidate for J.D. 2021, Alexander Blewett III School of Law
at the University of Montana.
1
Brief of Amicus Curiae American Property Casualty Insurance Association in
Support of Petitioner at 3, Maryland Cas. Co. v. The Asbestos Claims Court, and
The Honorable Amy Eddy, Asbestos Claims Court Judge (Mont. March 21, 2019)
(No. OP 19-0051); Opening Brief of Petitioner Maryland Casualty Company at
1–2, Maryland Cas. Co. v. The Asbestos Claims Court, and The Honorable Amy
Eddy, Asbestos Claims Court Judge (Mont. March 21, 2019) (No. OP 19-0051).
2
Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control and Request for Stay at 3, Maryland
Cas. Co. v. The Asbestos Claims Court, and The Honorable Amy Eddy, Asbestos
Claims Court Judge (Jan. 22, 2019) (No. OP 19-0051).
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1962 to 1973.3 Grace employed the Respondent, Ralph Hutt
between 1968–1969.4 In 2001, Grace filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy in the wake of countless asbestos-related suits.5 Hutt was
designated to be a lead plaintiff and was instructed to file his own
complaint against MCC and others.6 He did so, alleging that he was
injured by asbestos exposure, which MCC was aware of, at Grace’s
vermiculite mine in Libby, Montana (“Plant”).7
After the close of discovery, the ACC held oral argument on
each party’s motion for summary judgment.8 It granted MCC’s
motion in part, holding that MCC owed a duty to warn Grace’s
employees of the asbestos hazard based on the fact that MCC could
foresee the harm to Grace’s employees through its affirmative
actions.9 These affirmative actions included developing dust control
systems for Grace, conducting site inspections, providing warning
signs for Grace’s employees, medically monitoring employees’
health, and specifically creating a Safety Program10 to protect the
employees.11
Upon receiving this holding from the ACC, MCC filed a
Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control, asking the Montana
Supreme Court to exercise control over the ACC and provide a legal
determination of the applicable duty, if any, that MCC owed to
Grace employees like Hutt.12 The Supreme Court requested full

3

Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control and Request for Stay, supra note 2, at
5.
4
Id.
5
Opening Brief of Petitioner, supra note 1, at 3 (“Grace was involved in over
65,000 asbestos-related personal injury lawsuits . . .”).
6
Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control and Request for Stay, supra note 2, at
7; Opening Brief of Petitioner, supra note 1, at 13.
7
Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control and Request for Stay, supra note 2, at
8.
8
Id.
9
Order at 1, Maryland Cas. Co. v. The Asbestos Claims Court and The Honorable
Amy Eddy, Asbestos Claims Court Judge (Jan. 29, 2019) (No. OP 19-0051);
Respondent Ralph Hutt’s Response Brief in Opposition to Writ at 8, Maryland
Cas. Co. v. The Asbestos Claims Court and The Honorable Amy Eddy, Asbestos
Claims Court Judge (April 18, 2019) (No. OP 19-0051).
10
Order, supra note 9, at 1 (where the ACC relied on MCC’s affirmative actions,
including development of a safety program and medically monitoring workers, to
hold that MCC had a duty to warn Grace’s employees).
11
Respondent’s Response Brief in Opposition, supra note 9, at 8.
12
Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control and Request for Stay, supra note 2, at
2, 4, 17.
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briefing to consider the substantial legal issue, 13 and to decide if it
must exercise supervisory control over the ACC’s holding.14
III.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

MCC claims that the ACC committed a mistake of law when it
refused to apply Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A in
determining if MCC owed a duty to Grace’s employees.15 Section
324A states that a party (i.e. MCC) is liable for the damages of third
persons (i.e. Hutt) if it voluntarily chooses to render services to
another (i.e. Grace) that it should “recognize as necessary” for the
protection of the third person in three situations: (1) when his failure
to exercise care increases the risk of harm; (2) if he undertook to
perform a duty of the middle party owed to the third person; or (3)
if the third party is injured because the third party or the middle party
relied on the undertaking.16 The ACC’s decision not to apply §
324A, if affirmed, would place Montana in the minority of
jurisdictions.17 Hutt argues that solely applying § 324A is an
unnecessarily narrow standard, and argues that the ACC did not
make a mistake of law.18
The parties do not dispute that Grace exercised exclusive
control and authority over the plant.19 However, they do disagree
that the affirmative actions taken by MCC in relation to the Plant
constituted an undertaking that created a duty towards Grace’s
employees. In making its decision, the ACC relied heavily on
MCC’s drafted Safety Plan for Grace, among other affirmative
actions such as recommending solutions for dust control,
establishing dust exposure goals for Grace, providing warning signs
for the workers, and preparing a Safety Program.20

13

Order at 2, Maryland Cas. Co. v. The Asbestos Claims Court and The
Honorable Amy Eddy, Asbestos Claims Court Judge (Feb. 19, 2019) (No. OP 190051) (In this case the issue [MCC] raises is a substantial legal issue that may
significantly impact not only the trial of this case, but potentially the trials of
hundreds of other similar cases.”).
14
Id.
15
Opening Brief of Petitioner, supra note 1, at 1–2.
16
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A.
17
Brief of Amicus Curiae American Property Casualty Insurance Association in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 1, at 1, 3–4.
18
Respondent’s Response Brief in Opposition, supra note 9, at 9–10, 21.
19
Id. at 22; Opening Brief of Petitioner, supra note 1, at 8.
20
Respondent’s Response Brief in Opposition, supra note 9, at 8.
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Petitioner Maryland Casualty Company’s Argument

MCC argues that the ACC committed a mistake of law when it
denied, in part, MCC’s Motion for Summary Judgment.21 MCC
contends that the ACC mistakenly based its decision regarding duty
on a foreseeability analysis alone, instead of the correct analysis
under § 324A.22
Referencing its contract with Grace, MCC argues it owed no
duty warn Grace’s employees of any safety or health hazards.23
Additionally, MCC points out that it was not the only party to
conduct inspections of the Plant or consult with Grace regarding the
Plant’s health and safety conditions.24 MCC asserts that only Grace
had the ability to implement any recommendations received from
any party,25 and that Grace even chose to reject MCC’s
suggestions.26 Further, MCC questions the credibility of the Safety
Plan used to justify the ACC’s holding, noting that this Safety
Program document was never signed or dated and has no context or
foundation because it is not on MCC letterhead.27
MCC argues that the ACC did not evaluate whether a duty was
even owed and used an unsupported analysis.28 Under the § 324A
standard, MCC contends no duty was owed because (1) MCC did
not increase the risk of harm through the undertakings it took in
conjunction with Grace; (2) MCC did not take on a duty that Grace
owed to Hutt; and (3) because MCC did not cause the injury incurred
by Hutt while working at the Libby Plant owned and operated by
Grace.29 To counter Hutt’s argument that § 324A is too narrow,
MCC points out that two states have not adopted § 324A because
the Restatement is too lenient.30
21

Opening Brief of Petitioner, supra note 1, at 1.
Id. at 15–16.
23
Id. at 4 (“The language of MCC’s workers’ compensation policies
circumscribed MCC’s role with Grace and provided the following . . . ‘Our
inspections are not safety inspections . . . we do not undertake to perform the duty
of any person to provide for the health or safety of your employees or the public.
We do not warrant that your workplaces are safe or healthful or that they comply
with laws, regulations, codes or standards.’”).
24
Id. at 6–7.
25
Id. at 9–11 (where Grace would not pay for a study reducing dust and
monitoring employee health, and did not inform its employees of the results of
medical examinations for years).
26
Opening Brief of Petitioner, supra note 1, at 9, 38.
27
Id. at 12.
28
Id. at 20.
29
Id. at 16.
30
Reply Brief of Petitioner Maryland Casualty Company at 10, Maryland Cas.
Co. v. The Asbestos Claims Court and The Honorable Amy Eddy, Asbestos Claims
22
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Respondent Ralph Hutt’s Argument

Contrarily, Hutt presents a three-prong framework for a duty
analysis: (1) whether injury from the conduct was foreseeable; (2)
how the defendant’s actions relate to foreseeability of the injury; and
(3) the public policy behind the established duty.31 Hutt argues that
MCC was aware that Grace employees were being exposed to
asbestos dust and that the exposure could lead to serious injury.32
Hutt contends that this knowledge, along with MCC’s affirmative
actions to control the hazard and recommend a safety program,
created a duty for MCC to warn Grace employees of the danger.33
MCC’s failure to do so while still undertaking to protect
employees—including dust control engineering recommendations,
establishing safe asbestos exposure goals, and developing a Safety
program34—Hutt argues, created an ongoing injury.35Hutt also
argues, relying on policy evaluations in Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v.
Devries,36 that public policy consideration should be strongly
considered and, when evaluated, suggest that a duty existed here.37
Perhaps the largest focus of Hutt’s argument is the aspect of
foreseeability, which he argues is the primary consideration in
analyzing if a duty existed to a third party like himself, as Grace’s
employee.38 Particularly, Hutt argues that the ACC correctly looked
at how MCC’s conduct allowed it to foresee a risk of injury to the
employees of Grace, and thus created a duty.39

Court Judge (May 2, 2019) (No. OP 19-0051); Brief of Amicus Curiae American
Property Casualty Insurance Association in Support of Petitioner, supra note 1, at
8.
31
Respondent’s Response Brief in Opposition, supra note 9, at 8–9.
32
Id. at 12–13.
33
Id. at 13–14.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 12.
36
139 S. Ct. 986 (2019); Respondent’s Response Brief in Opposition, supra note
9, at 14–15.
37
Respondent’s Response Brief in Opposition, supra note 9, at 14–19 (Hutt
contends that public policy is in his favor based on (1) how much MCC was
involved in the asbestos hazard; (2) the fact that injury to employees from asbestos
was practically unavoidable; and, (3) the fact that MCC was resting on the
ignorance of employees, mentioning the specific, extensive Safety Program MCC
created that is at issue, the fact that the workers were likely reassured by the lack
of warning given about the dangers and the fact that MCC debated to keep the
information a secret while knowing that legal claims and numerous lung
abnormalities were already present).
38
Id. at 10.
39
Id. at 12.
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He argues that MCC undertook specific affirmative actions that
perpetuated the injuries, and those injuries were foreseeable through
the undertakings.40 Hutt relies on Kent v. City of Columbia Falls,41
which establishes that in Montana, if one gratuitously undertakes to
do something then that person has a duty to take reasonable care in
doing so.42
He also argues that Montana has rejected the aspects of reliance
and increased risk that are set up in § 324A.43 Even so, Hutt contends
that if these elements were pertinent under Montana law, they would
still impose liability upon MCC because Grace’s employees did rely
on MCC’s lack of action—taking it to mean that the risk was low—
and by doing so were exposed to an increased risk.44
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS
Existence of a Duty

The difficult issue before the Court is what duty exists for a
workers’ compensation insurer to its insured’s employees. Whether
a duty exists is a question of law.45 Under Montana law, every
person has a duty to act in a reasonable manner, such to not injure
another person.46 Foreseeability is a crucial factor that must be
considered,47 because a duty arises when injury to another is a
reasonably foreseeable result of a person’s conduct.48
Generally there is no duty to protect others from the acts of third
parties,49 but liability can arise to third persons for affirmative
40

Id. at 13, 22.
350 P.3d 9 (Mont. 2015); Respondent’s Response Brief in Opposition, supra
note 9, at 19.
42
350 P.3d at 19.
43
Respondent’s Response Brief in Opposition, supra note 9, at 33.
44
Id. at 36–38.
45
Emanuel v. Great Falls Sch. Dist., 209 P.3d 244, 247 (Mont. 2009).
46
MONT. CODE ANN. § 28–1–201 (2017).
47
Mang v. Eliasson, 458 P.2d, 777, 781 (Mont. 1969) (where if harm is
foreseeable to a reasonable person—with a reasonable person being defined as
someone who would have foreseen the harm to happen—then that both creates a
duty not to cause the harm and creates a limitation of liability, and if no
foreseeability of harm from the act can be seen by a reasonable actor then the actor
cannot be negligent).
48
Emanuel, 209 P.3d at 247 (“[i]f a reasonably prudent defendant can foresee
neither any danger of direct injury nor any risk from an intervening cause he is
simply not negligent.” (citation omitted)).
49
Lopez v. Great Falls Pre-Release Servs., 986 P.2d 1081, 1086 (Mont. 1999)
(overruled on other grounds); Knapton v. Monk, 347 P.3d 1257, 1260 (Mont.
2015) (where a standard negligence action has four crucial elements: (1) a duty
41
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undertakings, as detailed by § 324A.50 Hutt contends that Montana
law comports with § 324A, but rejects “reliance” and “increased
risk” and believes that § 324A is “rigid and unreasoned” because
there may be other situations in which liability can arise.51
In making its decision, the Supreme Court must consider
MCC’s affirmative actions, as they are the crux of whether or not a
duty exists. Hutt argues that these affirmative actions made the harm
clearly foreseeable to MCC52 and increased the employees’ risk,53
creating a duty which MCC breached by failing to warn Grace’s
employees. MCC counters that the § 324A standard provides a wellestablished, comprehensive analysis of duty.54 Under this analysis,
(a) MCC did not increase the risk of harm compared to what the risk
would have been without MCC’s actions;55 (b) MCC did not replace
Grace in owing its employees a duty to provide a safe work
environment, but merely supplemented Grace’s duty by providing
recommendations and drafting a safety plan in collaboration with
Grace’s input and ultimate implementation;56 and, (c) Hutt could not
have relied on MCC because he hadn’t ever heard of MCC and
Grace did not rely on MCC because it refrained from implementing
MCC’s recommendations and sought recommendations from other
companies.57
The Court’s decision will play a crucial role in the ACC
moving forward, and will affect the outcome of hundreds of claims.
If the Court finds that the ACC did commit a mistake of law, and
holds that § 324A is the correct standard, this precedential decision
could potentially inhibit successful outcomes for many plaintiff
asbestos claims. Due to a majority of jurisdictions accepting §
324A,58 the fact that MCC believes this is the correct standard, and
the fact that Hutt agrees Montana law already comports with §

must exist; (2) that duty must be breached; (3) the breach must have caused the
plaintiff’s injury; and, (4) damages were incurred).
50
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A.
51
Respondent’s Response Brief in Opposition, supra note 9, at 28–29, 33.
52
Id. at 13.
53
Id. at 38.
54
Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 30, at 2–4.
55
Opening Brief of Petitioner, supra note 1, at 36 (“. . . the correct inquiry is
whether the defendant’s undertaking increased the risk compared to what the risk
would have been absent the undertaking.”).
56
Id. at 37.
57
Id. at 38–39.
58
See, e.g., Fackelman v. Lac d’Amiante du Quebec, 398 N.J. Super. 474 (App.
Div. 2008).

8

MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE

Vol. 80

324A,59 the Montana Supreme Court may find this to be the correct
standard. This seems to be the most likely outcome.
Nevertheless, the Court may be sympathetic to Hutt’s argument
and find that the standard application of § 324A leaves asbestos
plaintiffs at a disadvantage, since workers’ compensation insurers
who were aware of the ongoing injury, and the injury was
foreseeable to them, are potentially not liable under a § 324A
analysis. This would leave many plaintiffs with one less avenue of
recovery. In this case, the Supreme Court could potentially establish
a middle ground60 between the two arguments, that doesn’t leave
either party at a disadvantage.
B.

Writ of Supervisory Control

The exercise of supervisory control is an extraordinary remedy
and appropriate when urgency or emergency is present making the
normal appeals process inadequate, when a legal question must be
decided, and when one or more of the following circumstances exist:
when a mistake of law has been made leading to gross injustice,
when constitutional issues having a state-wide effect are involved,
or when a motion to substitute a judge has been denied in a criminal
proceeding.61 The Montana Supreme Court evaluated these factors
in their decision to request full briefing in regards to MCC’s Petition
for Writ of Supervisory Control.62
After considering ACC’s standard compared to established
Montana law, it seems likely that the Montana Supreme Court will
grant the Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control and take
supervisory control to determine the correct duty, if any, that a
workers’ compensation employer owes the employees of its insured.
59

Respondent’s Response Brief in Opposition, supra note 9, at 28–30 (arguing
that Montana law is consistent with § 324A because it also applies a duty of care
to those who undertake a service that deals with a risk of injury to a third party).
60
See, e.g., Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986 (2019) (holding
that in a maritime context a middle ground was the most appropriate solution
because it did not impose a costly burden on manufacturers or an over warning
for consumers).
61
Mont. R. App. P. 14(3) (2017).
62
MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2(2); Order, supra note 13, at 1–2; Respondent’s
Response Brief in Opposition, supra note 9, at 7; Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra
note 30, at 1; See, e.g., Lamb v. Dist. Court of the Fourth Jud. Dist. Of Mont., 234
P.3d 893 (Finding that a writ of supervisory control was the appropriate solution
because the normal appeals process was not adequate, urgency factors existed, it
was a purely legal question, and the District Court made a mistake of law when it
granted a motion to stay on a bad faith claim pending the total receipt of medical
benefits that would continue for the remainder of the plaintiff’s lifetime).
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Establishing a duty to a third party solely based on foreseeability of
injury from a party’s affirmative actions, as the ACC did, creates a
new analysis of duty that the Court has not yet considered. Even if
the Court is sympathetic to Hutt’s argument, it still seems likely that
Court will not accept the ACC’s duty and will exercise supervisory
control to format the standard to better comport with § 324A and
established precedent.
V.

CONCLUSION

While foreseeability plays a huge role in establishing a duty,
the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides an established, widely
accepted analysis of liability to a third party for affirmative
undertakings. The Court will likely grant the Petition for Writ of
Supervisory Control to ensure the ACC is employing the correct
standard. The Court may find that the correct applicable standard is
found in § 324A, or it may look for a standard that leaves both
parties without disadvantage. Ultimately, the decision of the
Supreme Court to grant or deny the Petition will carry heavy
ramifications in asbestos litigation for all parties involved, whether
they are insurers, employers, or injured employees.

